The Hungarian teams of the 50s and the Dutch teams of the 70s developed
a new approach to the game of soccer, an approach that came to be known as
"total football." Their football was characterized by players constantly
changing places on the field with an aim to create space for unmarked
players making runs from the back. It was as if these teams had extra
players in their attack. As you might imagine, it created chaos for the
defending team.
Eric Batty in his 1969 book, Soccer Coaching the Modern Way,
discussed the revolutionary play of the Hungarians and the methods they
used. He made this observation:
"In the modern game all front players are tightly marked and will be
followed wherever they go. It is impossible to create space for the
front players...At any moment when their team is in possession, any of
the unmarked players from the back (midfielders or defenders) will break
through if space can be created for them."
 Mark
Catlin, in an equally revolutionary 1990 book,
The Art of Soccer, talks about a system of play based on player
movement, a form of total football not using formations or positions. He
describes play simply:
"The attacking team continually seeks to penetrate the defense by
sprinting to goal after passing. This essential movement starts many
combination plays. After any square or through pass, a covered player
should sprint to space."
In the following three diagrams, I reconstruct the opportunity that was
created by a super unmarked run from the back. The situation developed in
Colombia's play against the USA in Copa '95.
The game was the third place match in that year's Copa American Cup
held in Uruguay. By the time this goal occurred--in the 77th
minute--Colombia had the game well in hand. They led 3-1 and were
dominating play.
The Colombians in Faustino Asprilla (#11), Luis Quinonez (#20), Fredy
Rincon (#19), and Carlos Valderrama (#10) had world-class players that
played well together: the first two strikers and latter two the top inside
midfielders in Colombia's unusual 4-2-2-2 scheme of play. The four are
identified in the accompanying diagrams by numbers. Their run of play is
followed through the sequence of play.
 As
shown in Diagram 1, play started with Valderrama's free kick back to a
teammate, a kick taken into "negative space" (pass one shown in yellow).
That player then spoted Asprilla (#11) on the opposite flank at the back
of the USA's defense. His second touch (indicated here in red) sent the
ball there, but the long, flighted ball allowed Alexis Lalas to step in
front of Asprilla and head it down to a teammate. Had the pass been
completed though, the entire midfield would have been bypassed and
Asprilla might well have been able to go one-on-one against Lalas--a
striker's dream. This is an example of a switched-field, long ball made
with purpose. It is potentially a more dangerous ball than one played
directly to Rincon (#19) or Quinonez (#20) at the midline or to the
unmarked sweeper to the defender's right. It was a chance worth taking
because even the turnover left the entire Colombian team behind the ball.
But Cobi Jones couldn't hold the pass from Lalas; it dribbled on to an
unmarked Quinonez at the midline. Continuing play in Diagram 2, Quinonez
took four touches on the ball to advance it past the midline while
Valderrama (#10), Rincon, and Asprilla (#11) repositioned themselves to
support. Their movements are shown by the arrows.
As the defense collapsed on Quinonex, he passed to Rincon, who himself
held the ball for two touches, drew three defenders, then passed
possession on to Valderrama on a forward diagonal (Diagram 3).
By this time in response to Valderrama's possession, the ball-watching
defenders, responding independently, inadvertently flattened their back
line of defense. After this pass two things happened to spell disaster for
the USA: Asprilla led Lalas across the field towards Valderrama and the
ball, and Rincon sprinted through from the back into the space these two
had just vacated (the dashed line).
As further developed in Diagram 3, Valderrama took two touches then
passed the ball back out wide to Quinonez on a back diagonal, and Quinonez,
in turn, took two touches knocking it to the front of a sprinting Rincon.
Rincon then took three touches, shot the ball off the near post, recovered
his ricochet, then finally scored with a shot off the far post. The entire
sequence of free kick to goal took 22 seconds!
This run of play offers an example of the many aspects important to
quality soccer play--both the good and the bad: (1) the Colombians
immediately got their offensive talent around the ball and supported the
player in possession by offering several options to hold possession; (2)
they created dangerous space in front then attacked it with an unmarked
run out of the back; (3) they used the pass inside to flatten the back of
the USA's defense and drew defenders; and (4), they used the long,
switched ball effectively. The USA's defenders, on the other hand, allowed
themselves to become flat in the back, to ball watch, and to swarm to the
ball, but most importantly, they failed to notice Rincon's run from the
back.
 I
close again quoting Catlin:
"Space is the focus of almost all
offensive activity. Players either have space, are moving to space, or
moving to create space for others. Good players constantly look, noting
the evolving distribution of usable space. The ball flows from one area
of space to another. When possible, the spaces are used to carry the
ball toward goal. When possession is threatened, the ball moves
backwards or sideways to space. Typically, the path to goal is not
direct, but convoluted."
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